美國加州聖地牙哥台灣同鄉會
San Diego Taiwanese Cultural Association
http://www.taiwancenter.com/sdtca/index.html
  2007 年 7 月

Professor Kazuhiko Togo's lecture titled "Japan-Taiwan Relations"
Reported by Ching-Chih Chen

[Kazuhiko Togo, who was Japan's ambassador to the Netherlands until his retirement in 2002, is currently a visiting professor at University of California, Santa Barbara. Thanks to Andy Chang's assistance, TACC was able to invite a retired high-ranking diplomat of Japan to give a talk at TACC auditorium on June 2, 2007.]

Professor Togo briefly explained how he had become interested in Taiwan after his retirement. A few years ago, at Holland's Leiden University, as a visiting professor, Togo met a Taiwanese scholar/researcher. Both of them were interested in the phenomenon of rising nationalism in Asia, particularly in Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan. Subsequently, through this Taiwanese scholar's recommendation, he was invited to teach for a semester at Tamkang University in the Fall of 2006. Since then he has become fond of Taiwan and its people.

After this short informal remark, Professor Togo got right down to his well-prepared and well-organized lecture with the aid of a powerpoint projector. He divided his talk into three parts: history of postwar Japan-Taiwan relations, current Japanese policy and measures toward Taiwan under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and the issue of Taiwan's "Status Quo."

In 1952, Japan signed a Peace Treaty with Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan) and thus began official diplomatic relations between the two countries. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty of the same year committed the U.S. and Japan to the "mutual defense" of Japan and other non-Communist countries of "Far East" which was defined as north of the Philippines including territories under the control of South Korea and Taiwan. During the Cold War, while she recognized ROC-Taiwan, Japan, observing strictly separation of politics and economics, had only trade relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In July 1971, the Japanese were shocked by the surprised announcement of Nixon's plan to visit China and to support PRC's joining the United Nations. Fully aware of the strategic importance of Taiwan to her national interests, Japan endeavored to keep ROC (Taiwan) in the U.N. In particular, former Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who knew Chiang Kai-shek well personally, made a special visit to Taiwan to see if he could persuade Chiang to keep ROC under the name of Taiwan in the UN. Unfortunately, he had no success.

Following the U.S. lead of issuing the Shanghai Communique in February 1972, Japan on September 29, 1972, issued a Joint Communique with China stating that the Government of Japan "understands and respects" the PRC position of claiming Taiwan as a part of China. Japan, however, also explicitly expressed in the Communique its advocacy of "peaceful resolution" of the Taiwan issue. Professor Togo referred to these principles as the two pillars of Japan's foreign policy toward the issue. As a result of the rapprochement, Japan switched its diplomatic recognition from ROC (Taiwan) to PRC. However, cultural and economic relations with Taiwan continued.

Throughout the 1970's the Japanese were in general grateful toward Mao Zedong as well as Chiang Kai-shek for their not having demanded Japan to pay war reparation. Japan also welcomed China's economic reform under Deng Xiaoping's leadership and consequently pursued an "engagement policy" toward China. According to Togo, Japan was quite understanding of China even after China had brutally crushed the Tienanmen pro-democracy movement on June 4th, 1989. In 1992, as a symbol of Japan's political reconciliation with China, Japanese Emperor Akihito visited China.

By the mid-1990's, changing circumstances have contributed to Japan's becoming more sympathetic toward Taiwan while antipathetic toward China. The Japanese have shown their good will toward Taiwan as a result of Taiwan's rapid democratization, in which native-born Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui became the president of Taiwan after the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1988, and DPP's Chen Shui-Bian subsequently won the presidential election in 2000 and again in 2004 and thus ended the KMT dictatorial rule in Taiwan. The Japanese also have much appreciated Lee Teng-Hui's positive evaluation of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan (1895-1945). More importantly, mindful of the importance of Taiwan Strait's remaining as an international water to Japan's economic security, Japanese decision-makers have naturally favored stability and security in the region surrounding Taiwan. At a meeting of top defense and foreign affairs officials in 2005, Japan and the U.S. agreed to adopt a common strategic objective of insisting on the need for employing "peaceful resolution through dialogues" to resolve the Taiwan issue.

In the meantime, Japanese antipathy toward PRC was becoming more evident as a result of China's rising economic power as well as military might, China's launching missiles near the Taiwan waters in 1995-96, and their repeated nuclear tests. The Japanese also felt disrespected by Jiang Zemin's rudeness shown in his public speeches made while visiting Japan in 1998. In addition, the Japanese were very much turned off by the Chinese ultra-nationalism as unmistakably demonstrated in Asian soccer games and anti-Japan protests in China in 2004-05. On the other hand, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visit to Yasukuni Shrine did not help Japan-China relations either.

Shinzo Abe succeeded Koizumi as Japan's Prime Minister in September 2006. Among the Japanese leaders, Abe has been known to be the most sympathetic toward Taiwan. His understanding of East Asian history, Japan's security concern and Taiwanese identity issue serves as the basis for his sympathy. Therefore, people generally have expected that he would take some measures to strengthen Taiwan's position. However, intending to improve relations with China, he has so far being more conciliatory toward China than his predecessor Koizumi. He made an official visit to Beijing in October, 2006 and then received Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan in April 2007. In the Communique jointly issued by Abe and Wen on April 11, 2007, Japan pledged she would "firmly maintain the1972 Joint Communique." In terms of the Yasukuni Shrine issue, Abe's expressed opinion is that he would have "no comment and no denial." In addition, while acknowledging that political differences exist between Japan and China, Abe has emphasized the two countries' common economic interests. Relation with China has consequently improved. With other major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, on account of shared democratic values, Abe has promoted closer ties particularly with the U.S., Australia and India.

Finally, Togo focused on the issue of "Status Quo" across the Taiwan Strait. Nearly all countries involved have indicated that they are in favor of maintaining "Status Quo." However, they all have interpreted "Status Quo" in a way that best suits their own purpose. In Taiwan, the DPP and its allies assert that Taiwan is already a sovereign state even though the KMT is opposed to Taiwan independence as well as Beijing's so-called "one country two systems." China, on the other hand, has insisted that Taiwan is a part of China and consequently has opposed de jure independence for Taiwan. For Japan, "status quo" means abiding by the 1972 Joint Communique. As for the U.S., it is essentially the so-called "strategic ambiguity" as reflected in the three communiques that they jointly issued with China since February 1972 as well as the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

In reality, of course, there have been significant changes over the years. Since the 1980's while Taiwan has become democratized, China has been emerging to become a major economic and military power. In terms of real politics, Taiwan has been in the most difficult situation. According to Professor, Taiwan is sort of like a caged bird that has to rely on others for its sustenance. Beijing has been the one dictating what is allowed Taiwan. Bilateral economic and social contacts with Taiwan are encouraged by Beijing. Consequently, indirect trade and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait have increased. China, however, wants direct communication, trade and transport with Taiwan so as to make Taiwan dependent on China. Since 2005, Beijing has also extended red carpet treatment to visiting KMT leaders who are in favor of Taiwan's eventual unification with China. On the other hand, the Chinese government has continued refusing to deal even indirectly with the DPP-led government of Taiwan. Furthermore, it is doing all it can to isolate Taiwan from the international community of sovereign states.

Taiwan is a restricted member of Asia Pacific Economic Community and World Trade Organization. Professor Togo posted the following questions: Why can't Taiwan also be allowed to join World Health Organization, PSI (Pacific Security Initiative), Asia pacific Treaty, East Asian Community and Pacific Security Initiative? Why is not Taiwan allowed to negotiate and sign Free Trade Agreements with other countries? It has increasingly becoming clear that where ever Taiwan turns, Beijing has blocked it. Togo asked: What can Japan do for Taiwan? According to Professor Togo, most Japanese are actually in favor of Taiwan's future "to be determined by freely expressed will of the people."

Following his lecture, Togo took questions from an audience of nearly 60 people. Reflecting his professional diplomatic past, Togo was very deliberate in providing information and answers as accurate as he could. For example, he was asked would Japan assist the U.S. military when the Americans should come to the aid of Taiwan if and when China resorts to the use of force to annex Taiwan? Togo replied that Japan could not directly involve herself militarily due to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, he made it unmistakably clear that Japan would certainly defend herself if Japan should be attacked.